Move over Jesse: According to the Venezuelan daily El Universal, Hugo Chavez will act on behalf of the Colombian government to secure the release of hostages being held by the communist guerrilla group las FARC. This after Colombian congresswoman Piedad Cordoba visited Caracas last week to appeal for the Venezuelan president's help. Cordoba had been sent at the behest of Colombian president Alvaro Uribe.
The issue of the FARC, and its alleged ties to the Chavez government, is storied. Critics claim that the guerrilla group enjoys a privileged relationship with the Venezuelan regime. The evidence at times seems compelling. The first indication of ties between the two emerged during Chavez's first presidential visit to Colombia in 2001. As his personal body guard, Chavez took along Diego Serna, a longtime FARC associate. Then, in 2004, the FARC's top military commander, Ricardo Granda, was captured on the streets of Caracas, then smuggled to Colombia for imprisonment by Venezuelan mercenaries. The Chavez government had recently granted him citizenship. Soon after the Granda affair, turncoat members of Chavez's administration leaked documents to the press outlining supposed financial and material assistance to the guerrillas.
My how times have changed. Hoping that Chavez's influence with the group may lead to the release of scores of hostages, Uribe is playing a precarious political game. On the one hand -if the hostages are released- Uribe could be cast as a pragmatic statesman, willing to put the welfare of his citizens over the deep ideological and personal chasm between Chavez and himself. On the other hand, Uribe could be seen as impotent beside the growing regional power of Chavez, should the Venezuelan leader succeed where Uribe failed. The Colombian president has been locked in a stalemate with the FARC over the hostages since the beginning of his presidency.
Add to this the upcoming Colombia Congressional elections in October, and the calculation complicates further. Leftist Colombian politicians with warm ties to the Chavez administration will likely enjoy success at the polls if Chavez prevails. Cordoba particularly has been consolidating power, emerging as a potent rival to the Uribe presidency.
Meanwhile, Happy Hugo stands to profit handsomely from the deal, regardless the turnout. Chavez is quick to point out his influence in the internal affairs of foreign states. Being invited to participate in the Colombian negotiations is yet a further notch in president's belt. And who knows? Perhaps this will mark the beginning of a new stage in Chavez's political career: international crisis mediator.
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